Multi-bi aid in European development assistance: the role of capacity constraints and member state politics by Michaelowa, Katharina et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Michaelowa, K., Reinsberg, B. and Schneider, C. (2017) Multi-bi aid in European 
development assistance: the role of capacity constraints and member state politics. 
Development Policy Review, 35(4), pp. 513-530. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article Michaelowa, K., 
Reinsberg, B. and Schneider, C. (2017) Multi-bi aid in European development 
assistance: the role of capacity constraints and member state politics. Development 
Policy Review, 35(4), pp. 513-530, which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12193. This article may be used for non-commercial 
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/172867/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 5 November 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
1 
 
Multi-bi Aid in European Development Assistance:  
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Abstract 
 
We analyse the patterns of multi-bi aid in the European Union. Using newly available multi-bi aid data 
and a large number of staff interviews at the European Commission, the World Bank and bilateral 
donors, we draw three conclusions. First, the Commission’s capacity constraints and lack of specific 
expertise have prevented it from becoming an important host of trust funds like other international 
development organizations. Second, the same capacity constraints can generally explain its extensive 
participation in trust funds at other international development organizations. In the case of large 
global funds, however, Commission participation often reflects the outcome of member state politics. 
Third, once the Commission delegates its aid to multilateral agencies, it does not impose strong 
substantive earmarking, but requires a high level of legal and administrative controls.  
 
 
 
Key words: European Union, multilateral agencies, delegation, multi-bi aid, earmarking 
 
                                                   
*
 Author affiliations: Katharina Michaelowa, Bernhard Reinsberg (University of Zurich, Center for Comparative and 
International Studies, CIS), and Christina Schneider (University of California, San Diego). This article complements 
another paper on EU development assistance written in the context of the research program ‘The Proliferation of 
Multilateral Funds: Explaining the shift towards multi-bi aid and related institutions’, which contains a more general 
technical analysis (Michaelowa et al., 2015). We thank our interview partners from the European Commission for their 
time. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge funding from the Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS). 
2 
 
1  Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, donor governments have increasingly channelled their development assistance 
through trust funds hosted at international development organizations (IDOs).
1
 They did so on a 
voluntary basis (i.e., without long-term international commitments) and without generally dismissing 
their rights to determine the concrete project specification or geographical or sectoral allocation, which 
they enforced through various degrees of earmarking (Reinsberg et al., 2015a; Graham, 2015). To many 
donors, this so-called ‘multi-bi aid’, which is situated somewhere in between bilateral and multilateral 
assistance, appears to be an ideal strategy to implement the requirements of the Paris Declaration 
calling for donor cooperation and harmonization (Barakat, 2009: 108; Woods, 2005: 394; Barakat et al., 
2012: 2f.), and as a useful instrument to pool resources for the funding of global public goods that have 
received increasing attention over time (Heimans, 2004; IEG, 2011).  
The European Union (EU) is a particularly interesting donor to examine in the multi-bi aid context. 
First, it simultaneously plays a role as a bilateral donor and as an IDO. It can hence be examined both 
on the demand and on the supply side of multi-bi aid. As a bilateral donor, it may make use of trust 
funds located at other IDOs, and as an IDO, it can be the host of trust funds for development assistance 
provided by other bilateral donors. Second, the EU already represents a sub-group of bilateral donors, 
and is supposed to ensure coordination and harmonization among its members. If individual EU 
members want to coordinate with other donors, they can directly become members of trust funds at 
other IDOs. If the EU itself also becomes a member of such funds, this involves double-delegation (and 
related transaction costs), which runs against the spirit of the complementarity principle included in the 
EU’s Code of Conduct (EC, 2007). Moreover, it calls into question whether the coordination and 
harmonization arguments for multi-bi aid truly reflect the central motivation of the EU to use trust 
funds. Third, within other IDOs, the EU is frequently identified as a particularly burdensome partner 
for multi-bi aid. It appears important to examine the reasons for such assessments and how they can be 
reconciled with the EU’s willingness to participate in those trust funds in the first place. Finally, with 
an aid volume of over 16 billion dollars in 2014 (about 25% of its individual members’ development 
assistance), the EU institutions have emerged as the single largest multilateral donor and one of the 
largest bilateral donors on the global scene (OECD, 2015).
2
 Given the sheer size of its interventions it 
becomes interesting to look at its strategy, politics, and the resulting efficiency of its operations. 
Along with Michaelowa et al. (2015) this article is an early analysis of the politics of multi-bi aid in the 
EU. It focuses on the presentation of the complex economic and political considerations that determine 
the European Commission (EC)’s strategic choices. In other articles of this special edition, these 
choices appear strongly constrained by the EU’s collective action problem. This appears to be less 
relevant in the context of multi-bi aid. To some extent, multi-bi aid can even serve as a means to 
overcome collective action problems, an issue that will be highlighted below.  
Section 2 presents some historical data on the EU institutions’ involvement in multi-bi aid, and 
                                                   
1
  As compared to Reinsberg et al. (2015), who distinguish between organizations with and without implementing capacity, 
we use the term IDO more generally here for any type of international organization engaged in the area of development.  
2
  In 2011 and 2012, regarding their disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the EU institutions ranked 
second directly after the United States. In 2014, the United Kingdom and Germany ranked second and third.  
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discusses the puzzles we face when examining this evidence. Section 3 provides an empirical analysis 
drawing on information from interviews with officials at the EC, at other IDOs and in bilateral donor 
agencies. This information is triangulated with evidence from official reports, and with statistical 
evidence that is mostly based on a new dataset focusing on multi-bi aid, compiled by Eichenauer and 
Reinsberg (2016). Section 4 discusses the results and concludes. 
2  Some empirical evidence on the use of multi-bi aid 
EU members provide about 17% of their foreign aid resources through one of the three EU channels 
relevant for development aid: the common EU budget, the European Development Fund (EDF) and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). Except for the EDF, where contributions are voluntary and 
renegotiated every five years, they are calculated on the basis of gross domestic product (GDP) and are 
mandatory for all members. While the EU receives member country contributions, it is itself often 
considered as a bilateral donor, and can again decide between different channels of aid allocation 
including multi-bi aid. The concessional side of its development programmes has been managed and 
implemented largely by the Commission.
4
  For simplicity, we will always refer to the EC when we 
discuss multi-bi aid given through the European institutions in order to distinguish it from bilateral EU 
member aid, even though technically EU governments decide about the EU’s foreign aid resources 
through the EDF Committee, the Council of Ministers and other intergovernmental bodies in the EU. 
Let us first consider the EC’s use of multi-bi aid in its role as a bilateral donor. Figure 1 shows the 
development of its aid channelled through trust funds at other IDOs, both in absolute terms (panel 1) 
and relative to (pure) bilateral aid. The dashed lines show the development of multi-bi aid of the EU 
member countries for comparison. Ignoring the peak in 2005 that is due to the specific event of debt 
relief in the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), we observe a relatively 
steady increase of multi-bi aid for EU members. This trend in bilateral EU aid did not translate into 
similar trends at the European level, where the level of multi-bi aid constantly stayed at very low levels 
until the mid-2000s.  
From the mid-2000s onwards, the EC also started using trust funds hosted at other IDOs. Very quickly, 
the share of the EC’s multi-bi aid increased to a similar proportion of bilateral aid as for other bilateral 
donors, and in 2012, at more than 25% of the EC’s total aid, this share was even substantially higher 
than for EU member countries (about 13%). Provisional data from the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2015) 
indicate that the EC’s multi-bi aid has further increased substantially in 2013.  
                                                   
4
  See the introduction to this special edition for more information on EU aid, and Carbone (2007) for an excellent and 
comprehensive overview. 
Figure 1: The development of multi
Data source: Eichenauer and Reinsberg (201
At the same time, the EC did not seize the opportunity to generate own trust funds and thereby collect 
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Netherlands – and the MADAD Fund
5
 in response to the Syrian crisis, with initial contributions from 
Italy and Germany, only in 2014 (EC, 2015).
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This reluctance to set up its own trust funds is surprising. Would the EU not be an ideal institution to 
help some of its members to coordinate when they are willing to move forward on certain issues? 
Should the EC not have incentives to generate additional inflows of funding that would allow it to 
expand its field of activities? And why are member countries willing to contribute to the EC if the EC 
simply channels these funds through IDOs to which the member countries could have contributed 
bilaterally? Why are they willing to accept the transaction cost related to double-delegation (the other 
IDOs often charge considerable fees for their services)? A simple answer could be the EC’s capacity 
constraints. But if channelling aid through other IDOs is a means of reducing the EC’s own workload, 
why is the EC then simultaneously known for formulating a number of burdensome requirements, 
micromanaging the work of these other IDOs? 
We answer these questions one by one based on rich evidence from a large number of interviews in 
Brussels, at other IDOs, and with aid agency staff of EU member countries. Our Brussels-based 
interviews covered the EC, notably the Directorates-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (DEVCO/EuropeAid), for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), as well as the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). We refer to these statements explicitly whenever they serve 
as the main basis for our argument, and systematically indicate opposing views in the few cases in 
which they occur.7 
Information from these statements is then put in perspective by drawing on the general literature, 
agency reports and descriptive statistics based on a recent, comprehensive update of the OECD’s 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data to include multi-bi aid (Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 2014; 2016) 
and other DAC data (OECD, 2015). 
 
3  Assessing the EU’s engagement in multi-bi aid 
When assessing the reasons behind the surprising behaviour of the EC regarding the use of multi-bi aid, 
we consider both economic efficiency, and political or bureaucratic efficiency. While the former 
optimizes development outcomes, the latter optimizes the utility of different actors within the EU 
(member states, European Parliament, EC staff). Considerations about preserving the budget, the 
visibility of one’s interventions and pleasing one’s constituency fall in this category. 
                                                   
5
 Madad means ‘assistance’ in Arabic. 
6  
Union Trust Funds are the first trust funds in which (a subset of) member states and other donors can support a special 
program administered by the EC. This distinguishes them from pure funding facilities like the EU-Africa Infrastructure 
Trust Fund (EU-AITF) managed by the EIB and jointly governed by EU member states and the EC, or the Africa Peace 
Facility, which is legally based on the Cotonou Agreement, financed from EDF and governed by the EDF committee.  
7
  Overall, we carried out 30 semi-structured interviews, partially group interviews, mostly at the EC and EEAS in 
Brussels in November 2014, and at the World Bank headquarters in Washington in summer 2013. In 2012, the World 
Bank was the single largest IDO with respect to multi-bi aid received from EU institutions. Some complementary 
interviews were held by telephone at a later stage. Overall, the opinion of about 40 officials is included in our analysis. 
In the following sections, we refer to individual interviews with specific numbers (e.g., I-1) to provide the reader with an 
idea of the number of separate interviews supporting a particular view. However, to protect the identity of our 
respondents, we do not reveal the corresponding names. The list of interviews (without attribution to the individual 
numbers in the text) can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
6 
 
3.1 Why has the EC been so reluctant to set up trust funds? 
While several of our interview partners at the EC proudly reported about the activities to set up the first 
Union Trust Fund in 2014 (e.g., I-29; I-30; I-31), nobody mentioned why it took so long for the EU to 
engage in such activities in the first place. We explore several potential explanations. 
First, EU actors may simply be aware about the downsides of trust funds. These funds may distort the 
EC’s programme priorities due to bypassing their standard decision-making procedures, raise concerns 
regarding the transparency of the EC’s overall activities and the stringency of the monitoring and 
evaluation procedures applied, and increase aid fragmentation (see, for example, IEG, 2011; Tortora 
and Steensen, 2014; Reinsberg, 2016). However, when the EU finally launched its own trust funds, 
awareness about such general problems was much higher than before. Moreover, EC officials 
unanimously stated that Union Trust Funds would suffer much less from these problems. In fact, 
monitoring and evaluation was mentioned as a distinctive advantage of Union Trust Funds as compared 
to other IDOs (I-21), and as one of the reasons why the EC had eventually moved to setting up its own 
funds (I-19; I-20; I-26).  
In a single case, an official also mentioned that a member state directly opposed the opening of a Union 
Trust Fund due to fear of competition. The statement refers to the proposal of a trust fund on energy, 
the very first Union Trust Fund that was proposed, but never put into place: ‘The Germans killed it […] 
because KfW [the German development bank] works a lot in this area.’ (I-19). However, such direct 
competition should be a rare occurrence. While this particular case may have delayed the start of the 
EU’s own trust funds by a few months, it cannot explain why nothing happened over decades. In any 
case, only a single respondent mentioned this issue. 
Second, and more importantly, the sluggish adoption of Union Trust Funds may be related to legal 
constraints. Indeed, only in 2012 did member states adopt a new Financial Regulation that authorised 
the EC to set up and manage trust funds under an agreement concluded with other donors, including 
non-EU donors (EC, 2012). This was mentioned in several interviews (I-19; I-21). However, such 
regulations are endogenous to the influence of EU member countries. Our interviews suggest that for a 
long time, there was simply no demand for Union Trust Funds because EU members found their 
interests well addressed by trust funds at other IDOs. A major determinant of delegation to IDOs is 
their development expertise and capacity (Milner and Tingley, 2013; Schneider and Tobin, 2013; 
specifically on trust funds, see Reinsberg et al., 2015b). It seems that the EU member countries did not 
believe that the EC was as an IDO with a competitive edge in this regard. This would be in line with 
the criticism of the EC’s development knowledge and experience in the DAC Peer Review (OECD, 
2012). From this perspective, using trust funds at other IDOs was simply more economically efficient.  
Third, for a long time, EC staff itself may not have been interested in setting up Union Trust Funds. 
Typically, bureaucratic actors push for new trust funds as a means to acquire more funding or to expand 
their remit (see, e.g., Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011). Between 1980 and 2012, however, budget 
expansion was no strong motive within EuropeAid. Financial means for development aid at the EU 
institutions increased by over 500% in real terms (OECD, 2015). Our interlocutors explicitly stated that 
money inflows were often so large that the existing staff faced difficulties in handling them efficiently 
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(I-24). However, these considerations changed over time. Capacity substantially improved in the early 
2000s (although it then again declined over time, see below), as shown by two metrics: the rise in 
administrative cost hints to greater investment in human resources (see Figure 3 and discussion below) 
and general staff numbers at the EC have increased. Moreover, experience from trust funds at other 
IDOs revealed that such funds could provide greater flexibility to middle management, given that the 
existing EU funds can only be used for specific priorities. In addition, the EC’s top officials may use 
the funds to increase their weight in meetings with foreign ministers. Finally, many EC staff members 
realized that Union Trust Funds would enhance the EU’s visibility as a global development player. 
Visibility is a serious concern mentioned by EC officials (I-19; I-20; I-21; I-22) and also by World 
Bank staff speculating on why the EC entered the trust fund business (I-9; I-14; I-15; I-16; I-17). 
These bureaucratic and political advantages became clear during a period when conflict in Africa was 
increasingly recognized as a direct threat to Europe, and the humanitarian situation in the European 
neighbourhood became problematic due to the Syrian war. This created a window of opportunity for 
the creation of Union Trust Funds directed by the EC. 
3.2 Why has the EC been so strongly engaged in delegating to other IDOs? 
EC officials acknowledged that the strong evidence for double-delegation – from EU members to the 
EC and then to other IDOs – is puzzling, and that many observers question the efficiency of such 
arrangements.
8
 IDOs’ management fees are not negligible. For instance, the (standard) fee charged to 
host a trust fund is 5% of the relevant aid volume at the World Bank, and 7% at the United Nations  
(I-22). EU member states can join these trust funds directly and thus avoid one layer of administration. 
Furthermore, the visibility of the EC within such trust funds is generally lower than for the EC’s own 
bilateral aid. Finally, by delegating to other IDOs, the EC gives up its main function, in fact its raison 
d’être, to coordinate the activities of its member countries. 
The reasons for delegation to other IDOs that were provided by different EC officials varied 
considerably. We can distinguish between arguments related to EC staff capacity and arguments related 
to member country politics. The latter were mentioned primarily (if not exclusively) in the context of 
large multi-donor trust funds, the so-called global funds. The former related to a wide variety of funds 
including single-donor trust funds with the EU institution as the sole contributor.  
3.2.1 Capacity constraints 
EC staff argued that in recent years, the EC faced increasing demands while witnessing its own 
capacities decline. According to our interview partners, additional issues emerged on the agenda, but at 
the same time EC staff numbers declined (I-22; I-24; I-29). In this context, delegation was considered 
very useful since it was tying up less administrative resources than ‘direct management’ by EC staff, 
and thus enabled the EU to ‘do more with less’ (I-22).  
Since ‘lack of capacity’ is a standard complaint by bureaucracies, we cross-check the information from 
                                                   
8
  From a purely legal perspective, as noted by one EC official, there is no ‘double delegation’ because the EC has own 
legal personality. However, from a principal–agent perspective, the EC is the agent of its member states and the IDO in 
turn, the agent of the EC.  
the interviews with other data. If capacities are scarce, the EC should 
only to IDOs. Figure 2 shows that this is true for EC aid channelled through the private sector. 
Moreover, we should expect a strong use of general budget support
countries’ priorities and hence do
is equally confirmed by Figure 2. Indeed
any other bilateral donor (OECD, 2015). 
almost 2.5 times as high as that of 
second largest bilateral donor regarding budget support
of budget support declined among 
capture (see Koch, this issue). This
Figure 2: Aid channels avoiding EC capacity constraints
Data source: OECD (2015). 
To more directly assess the validity of complaints about capacity constraints, we would have liked to 
examine EuropeAid staff numbers. 
consider the development of administrative cost as a share of the 
bilateral and multi-bi aid). Figure
compared to three major bilateral donors.
2000s, the EC’s administrative costs slowly declined relative to the aid volume under its administration. 
The period of decline started just before the EC’s move towards multi
arguments we heard in our interviews.
Yet, administrative costs as a share of aid are about as high as for the three major bilateral donors, the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France. If they can be interpreted as an investment in staff capacity, 
despite the decline during the last few years, the EC should not be 
experience of some decline may explain the statements made in the interviews, taken these other 
countries as a benchmark, there should be no capacity problem, at least in quantita
However, capacity cannot only be measured in staff numbers and related expenses, but also in the way 
the existing capacities are managed or in subject
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Figure 3: The development of administrative cost 
* Total bilateral aid includes pure bilateral aid and multi
Source: OECD (2015). 
These are not the type of capacity problems bureaucracies tend to underscore, but given the 
independent evidence, they seem to be the d
knowledge and experience-based side of capacity limitations. 
instance, that while the EC has a 
concerned with policy dialogue, and not with
devolution of EC staff to the field further increased the 
Bank official stated that the ‘EC does not have enough experts 
countries’ – in contrast to the World Bank (and other 
the ground needed for rapid implementation
absorption of funds to support accession to the EU 
Tilev, 2008; Knezevic, 2011).  
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Given the recognition of its own capacity deficits, the EC tends to consider the delegation of aid to 
other institutions as efficient despite additional transaction costs. And it seems that among the different 
partners to whom EC staff can delegate its aid, IDOs are most highly valued. IDOs were identified as 
the ‘most efficient alternative’ for delegated aid (I-21). Due to unique expertise and their concrete 
mandate they have become the primary partner for EC officials. One EC official said that EC staff 
relied on IDOs ‘when nobody else can do it’ (I-30); another official explained that IDOs had an explicit 
mandate in some country contexts and hence nobody would work around them (I-21). One official also 
praised the flexibility implied by the partnerships with IDOs.  
Overall, despite the additional transaction costs incurred, multi-bi aid may turn out to be efficient given 
current capacity constraints at the EC. Of course, the best solution – at least in the long run – is to lift 
the capacity constraint or to better manage existing capacities (OECD, 2012). This appears to be above 
all a matter of organizational management and skills development, since – as opposed to what staff 
interviews may suggest – current limitations seem to be primarily of a qualitative, rather than 
quantitative or financial nature. 
3.2.2 Member state politics 
As opposed to capacity concerns that drive the EC itself into soliciting arrangements with other IDOs, 
there appear to be situations where this move is more directly driven by member countries. As 
mentioned above, this happens primarily in the context of large multi-donor trust funds, namely the 
global funds. Global funds are legally independent multilateral institutions that address specific 
development sectors and that have their aid programs executed by IDOs through multi-bi aid (Heimans, 
2004; Isenman and Schakow, 2010; Reinsberg et al., 2015a). Prominent examples of such funds with 
EU involvement are the Global Fund (to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria), the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC), the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), or the Global Partnership on Education.  
EU members participate in global funds in different ways. For example, only Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom are CGIAR council members, but the fund has 13 European donors including the EC 
(CGIAR, 2015). While the EC is not a council member in the CGIAR, it is a council member in the 
Global Fund, contributing about 4.5% of total resources (as compared to 0.7% for the CGIAR). 
In some cases, both the EU and member states individually are represented in the respective fund 
governing boards. Arguably, this double-representation increases overall transaction costs and hence 
undermines economic efficiency. It also seems likely that EU member states adjust their own 
contribution to global funds to the contribution by the EC (I-25). This suggests that EU members do not 
coordinate on funding decisions (I-20; I-24). One official explicitly stated: ‘This happens because there 
is not really any coordination between bilateral donors – even though they [i.e., the Member States] 
decide what the EU does’ (I-20). 
However, double-delegation implies tangible political benefits for all actors involved. These benefits 
counterbalance the potentially higher transaction costs (I-19). As one official put it, ‘[t]here is no 
economic rationale – but politically, it makes a lot of sense’ (I-29). Similar views were expressed by 
11 
 
officials of an important EU donor country (I-28). The EC itself has tangible benefits from its 
participation in global funds. An ‘EU chair’ enhances its visibility as an (independent) development 
actor. In addition, the EU believes that it can bring ‘added value’ to the practices of the Global Fund by 
insisting on strong fiduciary frameworks and strict monitoring (I-19). Within the EC, the economic and 
political advantages and disadvantages of participation are well reflected (I-19).  
What is more, the member states (collectively) benefit from a distinctive EC contribution to global 
funds. Financially, EC contributions enable the member states to reduce their own contribution without 
losing policy influence and without violating the international burden-sharing commitment underlying 
most global funds (I-25). Politically, the EC’s participation in global funds helps EU member states to 
demonstrate their commitment to a multilateral effort, even when they are unable to participate 
everywhere individually. This is particularly relevant for smaller member states. The ‘EU chair’ 
effectively gives them a possibility to ‘free-ride’ on the international attention to a high-profile 
development issue – an argument originally developed in the alliance literature (Olson and Zeckhauser, 
1966; Sandler and Hartley, 2001; Addison et al., 2004). As global funds also include many non-EU 
donors, the EU as a whole benefits from a leverage effect of its participation. EC support may also be a 
‘seal of approval’, serving as catalyst for such complementary contributions (I-22; I-25).  
To influence decision making within the global funds, a distinct ‘EU chair’ may also be helpful. Given 
the large number of non-EU actors represented, a distinct EU perspective can be more easily advocated 
if both member states and the EC have a voice at the table. Moreover, pre-pooling funds at the 
European level gives even small EU member states some influence on relevant policies (I-24).
9
 
Larger member states were also reported to be making strategic use of the EC’s investment in global 
funds to increase the political weight of their own contribution (I-24). The member state already 
participating in the fund takes over the representation of the EC as a whole and thereby substantially 
increases its influence over funding decisions. This view in which the ‘EU chair’ primarily serves the 
interests of the big powers is reminiscent of the inter-governmentalist approach (Moravcsik, 1993). In 
this case, the visibility of the EC itself is rather limited. 
Overall, the benefits from the EC’s participation in global funds tend to be high for the member states, 
possibly higher than for the EC itself. This also holds if individual EU members enter a fund along with 
the EC, and the EC reinforces their interest while simultaneously representing the interests of the non-
participating EU members. The EC thereby provides more weight to European positions. This may 
hence be perceived as an instance of well-working EU collective action. 
3.3 Why EC participation in trust funds is so burdensome 
Once the EC decides to participate in a trust fund, be it on its own initiative or at the initiative of 
individual member states, there seems to be an understanding that this cooperation will be beneficial. If 
so, why would the EC increase transaction cost for all actors involved and counteract the efficiency of 
this cooperation by its own exigencies? And why would the EC want to intrude into IDOs’ 
implementation activities given that its own lack of capacity was one of the key reasons for delegation 
                                                   
9
  Similar small-donor behaviour occurs in multi-donor budget support (see Faust et al., this issue). 
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in the first place? Yet, virtually all IDO representatives we interviewed reported that cooperation with 
the EU institutions is excessively burdensome, and EC officials, when confronted with this statement, 
never denied that this corresponded to reality. What are the reasons for this behaviour?  
The academic literature suggests that the burden for IDOs may be related to the intensity of earmarking 
associated with multi-bi aid since it limits the IDOs’ discretion in aid allocation and imposes the 
bilateral donors’ priorities (see, e.g., Sridhar and Woods, 2013; Reinsberg et al., 2015a). We hence 
examine the earmarking intensity of EU multi-bi aid as compared to multi-bi aid of other bilateral 
donors. The Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2016) dataset allows us to categorize multi-bi aid with respect 
to thematic, geographic and institutional earmarking, with three degrees of intensity for each category 
(no earmarking, soft earmarking and tight earmarking). For thematic earmarking, soft earmarking 
refers to specific sectors or fields of intervention, tight earmarking to specific projects. For geographic 
earmarking, soft earmarking includes (sub-)regional earmarking while tight earmarking refers to 
specific countries. For institutional earmarking, soft earmarking is a contribution to (sub-)division in 
the organization, while tight earmarking implies the delegation of staff for a concrete task. Many aid 
flows are earmarked on more than one dimension.  
Figure 4 presents the available data for the period since 2006 when EU multi-bi aid became a non-
negligible quantity. The data show that, generally, institutional earmarking is negligible, while thematic 
and geographic earmarking is widely spread. Along these two dimensions, as compared to member 
countries, the EC has a somewhat stronger tendency to use earmarking, and to use tight rather than soft 
earmarking. This must be expected because the EC is less flexible in how it spends money due to the 
specific rules underlying its budget instruments. In relative terms, the greatest difference takes place for 
thematic earmarking where the EC pre-defines concrete projects about twice as often as the aid 
agencies of its member states. Nevertheless, this happens only for 13% of all multi-bi aid that the EC 
channels through other IDOs. It appears surprising that such relatively small shares (and even smaller 
absolute differences as compared to the earmarking intensity of individual member agencies) should 
have led IDO staff to complain so heavily about the burden of cooperating with EU institutions. 
According to our interviewees, it seems to be the procedural and administrative requirements rather 
than the depth of earmarking that are considered the primary concern by IDO staff. World Bank 
officials state that dealing with the EU ‘is a nightmare’ involving cumbersome procedures and strict 
controls (I-1; I-6). In particular, Bank staff face separate audits from the EU, which require information 
at a level of detail that even the Bank itself sometimes cannot provide (I-8). To verify results, the EU 
also performs joint evaluation missions sponsored by the EU and must provide verification of results 
(I-3; I-4; I-13). One Bank official wondered about the ‘schizophrenia’ of the EU, which sometimes 
‘seems to forget its commitment to aid effectiveness when being obsessed with financial details’ (I-10). 
All queried Bank staff complained about ‘unprecedented levels of procedural controls’, going well 
beyond the requirements of most other donor countries (I-8; I-18). 
13 
 
Figure 4: The intensity of earmarking by EU institutions and member states (MS), 2006–2012 
 
Note: Within each category, percentages refer to earmarked projects as a share of multi-bi aid. By 
definition, multi-bi aid is always earmarked in at least one category. 
Source: Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2016). 
 
These statements are again in line with findings from the DAC Peer Review. In the recommendations 
for organization and management the 2007 review already identified the need to simplify procedures, 
and the 2012 review considers that ‘there is still a pressing need to simplify procedures further’ 
(OECD, 2012: 113).  
We also find some support in the Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2016) data that include separate codes for 
specific ancillary activities pursued through multi-bi aid (as far as these activities are reported in the 
qualitative project descriptions of the CRS database). Results presented in Figure 5 show that the EC 
more frequently contributes to evaluation and verification than the member states. For verification, the 
difference is particularly striking and clearly significant (t-statistic of 14.6), even if overall shares of aid 
activities for which any such activities have been reported, are quite small. In contrast to the EC’s 
procedural rules, EU member states tend to focus their ancillary activity in areas that signal a more 
substantial interest, namely missions and conferences. 
In sum, it appears that the EC earmarks its multi-bi aid somewhat more strongly than individual EU 
member states, but that the central reason for the burden it creates for IDOs are procedural 
requirements rather than the depth of earmarking. As this kind of ‘micromanagement’ (I-7; I-12) is of a 
more legal-administrative nature and does not require specific development expertise, it is not 
constrained by the limited development-related knowledge and experience of the EC staff. In fact, EC 
staff capacity in terms of legal and procedural knowledge (as opposed to substantive development 
knowledge) may even be relatively high. This can explain why we witness a delegation of aid to IDOs 
that is (at least partly) due to capacity constraints, while the EC staff simultaneously spends much time 
and effort on monitoring these activities. 
Figure 5: Ancillary activities financed by multi
Notes: Percentages refer to the share of activities in the CRS database, for which the specific purpose 
was explicitly mentioned in the qualitative project description. This may underestimate the true share
since such detailed reporting was not required. The different categories are not mutually exclusive as 
they can be funded within a single aid activity.
Source: Eichenauer and Reinsberg (201
 
An alternative explanation may be that the burden created for IDOs is 
staff’s own preferences, but imposed upon them by mem
Given their limited discretion regarding their financial contribution to the EC
strict accountability criteria imposed onto EC staff appear very plausible. 
projects directly or channels its contribution
this respect. According to EC officials, the Financial Regulation of the EU 
rules (I-6; I-20; I-29; I-30). In particular, the 
‘right to verify the financial management of a specific action performed by the [
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under delegated cooperation (I-25). Against this background, EC officials are obliged to ensure the 
traceability of delegated funds (I-20; I-21; I-24). This sometimes forces EC officials into less efficient 
multi-bi aid instruments, for example single-donor trust funds, even if the underlying purpose is to 
support the effort of existing multi-donor trust funds (I-11; I-21; I-22). This is, indeed, reflected in a 
very high share of single-donor trust funds within the overall number of funds the EC participates in. 
For the period from 2006–12, this share was about 85% (as compared to about 65% for EU member 
states; see Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 2016). One official noted that the related rules sometimes ran 
counter to the members’ expressed political will, and that they were also much stricter than their own 
national accountability rules. While the members’ jointly decided accountability rules did not allow the 
EC to become member of the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) ‘they do not 
need to account for CERF at home’. (I-19). Only the 2012 Financial Regulation somewhat loosened 
these constraints (I-24). Last, the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors also force 
the EC to negotiate liability clauses to ensure refunds from IDOs in case EC resources are lost.  
World Bank staff deplores that ‘pressures [from influential donor countries] are scaled up at the 
European level’, and that the EC ‘is unable to liberate itself from its own accountability pressures’ (I-
7). Especially when compared to the World Bank, ‘the EC is governed by constraints rather than by 
incentives’ (I-2; I-5). This again echoes concerns voiced repeatedly in DAC Peer Reviews:  
 
The development co-operation programme is under high scrutiny from both Council and 
European Parliament. As was recommended in 2007, this oversight could be made more strategic 
and focus more on the expected results, beyond controlling inputs and outputs. Detailed scrutiny 
currently leads to micromanaging the programme and hampers its effective delivery in the field 
(delays, lack of flexibility to respond to emerging needs, time consuming procedures) (OECD, 
2012: 111). 
 
However, not all EC officials we interviewed considered these strict regulations as a constraint on their 
freedom of action. In fact, a significant part of EC officials consider these strict rules as a value added 
of the EC. According to one respondent, given that the EC does not have any vital substantive policy 
interest, it can credibly be the custodian of aid effectiveness by ensuring the proper use of funds (I-19).  
Another official even directly objected to the proposition that complications were imposed by the 
member states: ‘The EC is complicated because we want accountability’ while ‘we’ referred explicitly 
to staff as opposed to the Member States.” (I-24). Clearly, opinions in this respect varied between our 
respondents. 
Outside the EU, there seems to be a broad consensus that procedural regulations are overly strong and 
inefficient. Some reforms towards greater flexibility have been carried out over time, but many 
problems remain. Among other things, EC staff seems to be more experienced in these administrative 
and legal procedures than in substantive areas of international development cooperation. Hence in 
terms of their own work management, delegating aid while retaining the monitoring tasks appears like 
a sensible strategy that matches their profile. In terms of overall aid effectiveness, this specialisation 
may, however, be problematic. 
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4  Conclusion 
Since the mid-2000s, the EC has become very active in the area of multi-bi aid. By doing so, it has 
followed, and even surpassed, the general trend by bilateral donors to channel their funds through 
IDOs. Given that the EU is already a multilateral institution that combines the resources of its member 
countries, its strong participation in trust funds at such IDOs seems like an inefficient double-
delegation strategy. However, given that the development-related capacity and expertise at the EC is 
scarce (while it is in ample supply at several specialised IDOs) from the EC’s perspective, multi-bi aid 
can be rightly considered as a promising approach. 
These IDOs, however, perceive the EC as a particularly burdensome donor. Its micromanagement is 
legendary – a fact that appears puzzling in light of its capacity constraints. Yet, these constraints relate 
to the appropriate deployment of development-related expertise while the EC’s micromanagement 
focuses primarily on legal and administrative procedures (where capacity within the EC is much 
higher). In addition, some interviews suggest that this micromanagement is not a deliberate choice of 
EC staff, but the EC merely passes on the pressure for control from other EU actors, notably the 
European Parliament and the Court of Auditors.  
Until recently, the EC’s lack of own development expertise has also contributed to its lack of interest in 
setting up and administering its own trust funds. However, the gradual removal of important regulatory 
constraints following greater demand from member states, and increased interest by the EC itself in 
recent years has catalysed the creation of the first two Union Trust Funds in 2014.  
Without going as far as other IDOs (which generates new problems of transparency, oversight and 
fragmentation), hosting a few trust funds may be an interesting way for the EC to implement its 
coordination function, not necessarily involving all members at a time. This may also help to solve 
potential collective action problems by giving more strongly engaged members a stronger voice and 
higher visibility. Moreover, this could move the focus from procedural aspects to subject-related ones, 
which could in turn be very helpful for the fruitful (and efficient) cooperation between the EU 
institutions and other IDOs.  
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